

Borders in Nigeria's Relations with Cameroon

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ABSTRACT

Border incidences are sources of irritants in the relationships between Nigeria and Cameroon. Examples are not far-fetched from Bakassi Peninsula imbroglio leading to hostile relationship between the two countries, and subsequent ruling of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon by the International Court of Justice in 2002. Indeed, this also led to the revival of the Joint Cameroon-Nigeria Border Commission entrusted with the task of demarcation of the Land and Maritime boundaries between the two countries, as mandated by the 2002 judgment. However, the demarcation exercise has caused confusion and anxiety with the inhabitants of the Cross River State, Nigeria, resulting in the inability of the team to locate pillar 133A, thereby erecting a new pillar. This exercise is lacking in proper consideration of the effects on the people in the demarcation of the land boundary. Thus, the paper finds out that the demarcation of the Land boundary which the International Court of Justice perceived as the antidote to the border skirmishes between Nigeria and Cameroon is likely to generate to another border conflicts between the two countries. This is so because, the erecting of new pillars will lead to another claim of some parts of Nigeria to Cameroon. Hence, the demarcation of Land boundary if not properly checked may be an outcome of future skirmishes and chaos.

Introduction

Numerous border incidences between Nigeria and Cameroon have been sources of irritants in the relationships between the two countries. They have not only caused suspicious, distrust and infractions, but have made undesirable headlines in the annals of neighbourhood of border studies. However, border incidences have remained a source of bilateral relations of the two countries since independence. Indeed, this disagreement has led to border clashes between both countries resulting in the loss of lives and property. This ought not to be so because of the various close affinities and joint cooperative activities between the two important West and Central African Countries. Nigeria and Cameroon bordered on the West by the Estuary of the Cross River, on the North by the AkpaYafe (also known as the Akpalkang), on the East by the Rio-del estuary and on the South by the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, Nigeria population of about 150 million covers a land area 924,630km extending from the Gulf of Guinea in the South to Niger and Chad Republic in the North; while Cameroon is estimated at 9.7million, occupying an area of 475,442km. One embarrassing fallout of the bad-faith between the two countries is the crisis and the third-party-intervention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the issues relating to their 1600 kilometer land boundary, extending from the Lake Chad Basin to the Bakassi Peninsula and the Maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea where it's acclaimed vital security and strategic interests. Among the many border disputes that Nigeria and Cameroon had in the past, the Bakassi imbroglio remains the most contentious. Although, there has not been any crisis over Bakassi in the past. It is interesting to say that long before the discovery of oil in Bakassi, Cameroonians and Nigerians in the region lived their normal lives, aside from few squabbles, as both countries did not pay attention to the region because it was a remote area inhabited by people considered to be non-consequential. But, the discovery of oil and other natural resources triggered hostilities in the region, as attention from both countries and from their colonial connections created tensions, arguments and ultimately deaths. The newly developed interest to the Peninsula created suspicious and mistrust among the inhabitants of the region. To Nigeria and Cameroon, it could be said that the conflict started as a result of the scramble for oil while the indigenes of Bakassi relate the conflict to the

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separation of families and tribes from their ancestral ties, due to the scramble of Africa. The African news magazine of 1996 – *Jeune Afrique* noted that “...tous les ingrédients d’ un conflit majeursoutreunis” This simply means that all the factors that lead to a major conflict are present in the Bakassi Peninsular and also in stressing the strategic importance of the Peninsula as a factor for escalation of conflict between the two countries. In essence, the conflict was epitomized by the large deposit of petroleum and natural gas which triggered hostilities and military confrontations. The two countries struggled over the mineral rich peninsula, which have culminated into the use of military force. Both countries are claiming ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula, the claim over the Bakassi by Nigeria is based on two major factors, namely The 1913 Anglo-German Treaty and the 1975 Mauro Declaration. While the Cameroonians arguments are based on the treaty of 1913 signed by Britain and Germany; with a clause to rearrange the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon from Yola to the Sea and regulate the navigation of the Cross River on the ownership of the region. Hence the inability to find a lasting solution to the crisis in the area aggravated not only the hostile relationship between the two countries but also brought about the militarization and internationalization of the dispute. For instance, in 1981, the Cameroon authority alleged that a Nigeria patrol army violated Cameroon’s territory by penetrating the Bakassi Peninsula as far as the Rio-del-Rey and opened fire on the Cameroon navy and her troops, while in a reprisal attack killed Nigeria soldiers as this was resolved diplomatically. Subsequently, armed assaults continued to plague the region. Again in 1987, Cameroonian gendarmes invaded sixteen Nigerian villages near Lake Chad and replaced the Nigerian flag with that of Cameroon. Similarly, there was the 1992-1993 attack resulting into open oppression in which Nigeria civilians in Cameroon were killed and coupled with the embarrassing tax assaults on Nigerians living in the area. Another explosive and combustive face-off broke out in 1994, which recorded many casualties and deaths of soldiers from both countries. It was after this incident that Cameroon decided to take the border dispute to the ICJ for adjudication, following the accusations from Nigeria that Cameroon was not committed to the bilateral negotiation to resolve the matter locally. Hence in 2002 the World Court ruled Cameroon as the rightful owner of the oil rich peninsula and the Green Tree Accord was implemented. The Green Tree Accord was an off-shoot of conflict diplomacy by the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Koffi Anna that sees to the final episode of the Bakassi Peninsula by handing over the region to Cameroon. Although, this agreement was initiated following Nigeria’s initial rejection of the ruling and her refusal to withdraw troops from the disputed area until the rights of the Nigeria population in the area is adequately protected. On November 15, 2007, the United Nations Secretary General invited the Heads of States of Nigeria and Cameroon, Olusegun Obasanjo and Paul Biya to a meeting in Geneva to work out plans on how to comply peacefully with the International Court of Justice’s verdict. However, the meeting led to the revival of the Joint Cameroon-Nigeria Border Commission. Thus, it stated that this commission would consider all the implications of the ICJ verdict, including protecting the rights of the affected population in both countries. Also, the commission would be entrusted with the task of the demarcation of the Land and Maritime boundaries between the two countries. The commission comprises of legal experts, cartographers from Nigeria, Cameroon and United Nations responsible for the demarcation of the Land Boundary. Finally, Nigeria handed over thirty two villages to Cameroon as part of the 2002 ICJ border deal, as both countries agreed to mount joint border patrols. Subsequently, Nigeria’s troops were withdrawn from the disputed area to settle its long running border disputes, leading to the loss of the oil rich Bakassi Peninsula to the Cameroon by the World Court Judgment in 2001. Hence, the Committee met in 2003 to prepare a map indicating the boundary and also considered the nature and characteristics of the maps that are needed for the demarcation.

However, this verdict aroused vitriolic comment in Nigeria, as they described the ruling as unfair, total disaster and complete fraud. Another important issue to this study is the internationalization of the conflict as well as the preponderance of western judges, France, could also be responsible for the accusations of institutional bias by Africans. In fact, the role of France was commented by the *Jeune Afrique* as “l’ alternative du diable” meaning the devil’s alternative indeed! This provoked much criticism from the Nigerian side. Over the years, there had been a sort of regional hostility between France and Nigeria, because France believes that the Francophone states of Africa are her domain which other countries must steer clear and also regarded herself as the policeman of Francophone Africa. This is evident in her total control of monetary policies and the circulation of Francophone States’ currency in Africa. Also, is the defence agreements and military cooperation France had with her former colonies in African States. This explains why often times when Nigeria has confrontation with Cameroon, Nigerian government is slow and unsure of what to do. It is because Nigerian government is aware that it will not only be engaging in military confrontation with Cameroon but also France, with whom Cameroon has a defence pact and military agreement, between 1963 and 2003. This has enabled France to intervene militarily in these states either to support incumbent government or overthrow unpopular regimes through coup d’ tat” in Francophone

African States. Therefore, it is the hegemonic relations that have made France to regard Francophone Africa as her traditional sphere of influence, which is considered off limits to other foreign powers including Nigeria. Strikingly, the relationship between France and Nigeria have been strained over some issues in the past, as France has always perceived Nigeria as the greatest enemy in Africa. First, is the inheritance hegemonic rivalry between France and Britain, which translated mutual hostility between France and Nigeria immediately after Nigeria's independence second, is the test of French atomic bomb in Sahara desert, this led to the decision by Nigerian government to break diplomatic relations with Paris as France regards this as a severe blow to their prestige in Africa. Hence, not only did Nigeria break diplomatic relations with France but also denied French aircrafts and ships landing and berthing rights from all Nigeria airports and seaports. However, the hostility between France and Nigeria came to peak at the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War. The French government under late Charles de Gaulle openly adopted Pro-Biafran policy and canvassed support for Biafra from the Francophone States such as Cote d' Ivoire, Senegal; Benin; Niger; Chad; Cameroon and Togo. It should be noted that France support for Biafra could be regarded as a payback for the humiliation inflicted upon France by Nigeria and also a golden opportunity to partition Nigeria into smaller units, who served as a major obstacle to France hegemonic power in Africa. It was believed that a united and over populated Nigeria constituted a threat to other neighbouring Francophone States in the sub-region because of Nigeria's population and enormous wealth. France promptly accorded diplomatic recognition to Biafra and provided both military and material assistance to them. Thus, relationship between France and Nigeria was later normalized. However, Nigeria suspected the role of France in the conflict in favour of Cameroon. France, although not directly involved in the process of colonial demarcation of the boundary took the stance that Bakassi belongs to Cameroon by citing treaties signed at and after independence was granted to both countries through the ICJ President, Gilbert Guillaume, a French citizen ruling in favour of its former colony-Cameroon. Therefore, France was seen by Nigeria as an actor in the conflict. It is important to note that among many factors that contributed to the border conflict was the legacy of both the imperialist colonial rule and the neo-colonial regimes in Africa at that time. For instance the colonial masters like Portugal, Germany, France and Britain used their selfish economic, political and strategic calculations of the 19th century for future African Conflict which was discussed in the latter part of the work. This was manifested in the divide and rule system of administration and partitioning of African States and its people irrespective of the damage it caused to them, such as language, socio-political life and cultural affiliations and ancestral lineage. This selfish act divided ethnic groups into territories, which later ignited turmoil and turbulence in many African states especially the Bakassi Peninsula which relate to this study. Thus, this tends to cause conflict because, in traditional African life, there is no separate compartment in culture, culture lies at the core of an African's life. Therefore, any attempt to separate or divide an African from his or her own culture leads to identity issues which in effect ignite conflict. Africans are fundamentally cultural beings and this culture defines their identity and shapes their personality.

Another issue that is germane to this study is the relations that existed between both countries over the years. Nigeria's relations with Cameroon have always been uneasy, difficult and tense because the Cameroonians perceive Nigerians as threat. The relationship is historically more of conflict since both of them attained independence. Though, there are few cooperative agreements between the two nations, especially on removal of visa, customs, extradition and scientific cooperation; in spite of these agreements, Cameroon has been the most belligerent and hostile to Nigeria, compare to other contingent neighbours, as it has engaged frequently in very hostile policies towards Nigeria. The reasons for this negative experience of age-long hostility includes- Nigeria's unequal size (especially, in terms of territory and population) when compared with Cameroon's; the colonial presence and the role of France in Cameroon and the availability of vital resources in the maritime and land border areas of the Bakassi Peninsula size. Furthermore, is the issue of smuggling and other clandestine trade activities along the border of the two countries. It is important to note that smuggling and black marketeering have become a normal way of life and continue to flourish, in spite of various institutions put in place to check the menace. Although, smuggling in the area may be due to age-long cross border interactions and the marginalization of the border area, in which the border communities continue to benefit socially and economically through smuggling. Thus, petroleum product bunkering, stolen vehicles, currency trafficking, smuggled agricultural products and later hard drugs constitute the major items that move from Nigeria into Cameroon. Also, the porosity of the border region has made informal and unrecorded trade more important than formal trade. Akindele and Akinterinwa in 1992 note that the problem is how to make the border less porous, more secure and how to curb illegal activities such as smuggling without hindering transnational movements. However, this study leapfrogs the above border relations between Nigeria and Cameroon such as the Bakassi Peninsula which has become a matter of history and the ensuing Green Tree Accord to address the demarcation of land

boundary between the two countries leading to the contemporary claim of the boundary stretching from pillar 64 to pillar 114 meters away from Cross River state in Nigeria as part of Southern Cameroon. Indeed, it is important to note that the land boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon border has four sectors. The first is the Lake Chad Tripoint to the Harare Gesumi uplands. The second is the sector of the River Gamana (boundary pillar 64) eastwards to Combon Mountains. From pillar 64, the third sector of the boundary runs eastwards to pillar 114 at the Cross River. The fourth sector runs from the Cross River down to the sea. This emanated from the mandate of the Mixed Commission which includes the demarcation of the land boundary comprising of cartographers, surveyors from United Nations and Cameroon. This contemporary claim arose from the inability of the surveyors to trace the Pillar 113A along the borderline. Thus, the inability to locate the Pillar 113A beacon made the path of the demarcation to be extended from Pillar 113 upward. The consequence of this extension would not only be the economic effects such as loss of long cash crop land but also the loss of some major communities in Cross River State to Cameroon. Also, is the fear of being entangled in another border dispute. Evidently, Nigeria border relations is more of distrust and hostility than cooperation. Hence, Nigeria has a lot of responsibility with respect to its neighbor in the region-Cameroon border. In light of the above, the demarcation of the land boundary, which is seen as the lasting solution to border problems between Nigeria and Cameroon is likely to degenerate into another border conflict.

Statement of the Problem

Dispute along the Nigeria-Cameroon border has been a matter of historic proportions especially with the Bakassi Peninsula and the contemporary claim of some parts in Cross River Nigeria by Cameroon. This is so because boundaries can be regarded as the geographical limits of a state as well as the extent of its sovereignty is a strategic features of nation's survival. The strategic importance explains why nations protect and defend their political boundaries. The implication of this protection in international relations is incessant territorial disputes among nations all over the continents of the world. It is important to note that territorial or boundary disputes are the most common sources of inter-state crisis in post-colonial Africa. Examples are not far-fetched from the Nigeria-Cameroon disputes over Bakassi Peninsula. The inability to resolve border disputes peacefully in the post-colonial Africa can be traced to the non-delineation of the dispute areas by the colonialists, the existence of rich mineral resources in most disputed areas. Thus, boundary is a sensitive issue in inter-state relations, it delimits the territorial jurisdiction of sovereign states as well as constitutes a major source of disputes in international relations.

However, the boundary crisis in Africa especially Nigeria -Cameroon which is central to this study has its root in the hasty and haphazard partition of the continent by the imperial powers of Europe towards the end of the 19th century, wherein African boundaries were delineated by the imperial powers in less than two years. The speed with which African boundaries were defined and marked, in view of the lack of resources and knowledge about the vast continent, meant that numerous errors, some of which have not been corrected to date were committed. The consequence of this was that, patterns of ethnic, linguistic, religions, cultural and commercial affinities were suddenly terminated. The boundary was arbitrarily imposed by the imperial masters; and the effects have continued to be a source of conflict. Asiwaju (1984) points out that in the study of European archives, the making of African boundaries are more of accident, as the European interests are more of primary concern and African interests were not put into consideration. According to Kapil (1966) he notes that the delimitation agreements were negotiated before detailed knowledge of the terrains and peoples in the interior of the continent was available. Also, the arbitrary nature of the African boundaries was testified by the Lord Salisbury-the British Minister in 1890, during an Anglo-French Convention by saying that, "We (British and the French) have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod: we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediments that we never knew exactly where mountains and rivers and lakes were". The above examples serve to confirm that the European imperial colonisers had little or no knowledge of the geography of states partitioned. Thus, the colonially inherited borders have brought about remarkable increase in boundary disputes and skirmishes between and among African States.

This point should also be underscored that the artificiality and arbitrariness of African borders are not only the products and reflections of rivalries in African States but also between the imperial powers. The colonial states and the borders that emerged out of these rivalries largely depended on how one imperial power outsmarted its rival, for instance, the Nigeria-Cameroon border around the Lake Chad region were drawn to reflect the rivalries among three dominant imperial interests: the Germans, the French and the British.

Added to this boundary problem is the issue of trans-border crimes that are on the increase due to the porosity of the borders. Examples are not far-fetched from the acts of smuggling, oil bunkering, and terrorism along the Nigeria-Cameroon borders.

The study on Nigeria-Cameroon border relations is a clear manifestation of arbitrary demarcation of the borders otherwise known as the Western-constructed boundaries on ethno-cultural affinities in Africa. Many border conflicts tend to emanate from the ill-defined nature of the boundaries that divide ethnic language groups with little or no consideration. Strikingly, Nigeria-Cameroon border was inherited from the British and Germans and subsequently, the British and French, which was not clearly and completely demarcated and has been a source of border conflict between the two countries. Also, the discovery of oil around the region intensify the ensuing conflict. Similarly to the demarcation lines imposed by colonial powers, the ruling of ICJ in 2002 succeeding Bakassi to Cameroon ignored the interests of Bakassi inhabitants when rendering its judgment. However, in spite of the signing of the Green Tree Agreement to resolve border disputes between the two countries, there still remains border incidences between Nigeria-Cameroon. This emanated from the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries as mandated by the 2002 judgment leading to the contemporary claim of some parts in Cross River Nigeria to Southern Cameroon. Although, this resulted from the inability to locate Pillar 113A, as the path of demarcation was extended from Pillar 113 upward. Therefore, it is evident that neither the ICJ ruling of 2002 nor the Green Tree Agreement and its implementation can resolve the border incidences between Nigeria and Cameroon as experienced by other African countries such as Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone on boundary incursions; such as the Angola-Namibian border; Chad-Sudan, Mail-Mauritania; and also Eritrea-Ethiopia in spite of the establishment of boundary commission and many more. All these are the complex and problematic issues in Nigeria-Cameroon border relations, which this study seeks to examine and analyse in detail.

Review of Literature

There are extant literatures on Nigeria/Cameroon border relations. The debate in the literatures focus on the Bakassi Peninsula; ICJ ruling on the inhabitant of Bakassi; trade issues; cross border crimes and many more. The lacuna that this study seeks to fill is the demarcation of the land boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon as mandated by the Nigeria/Cameroon Mixed Border Commission, which is the finally episode of Nigeria handing over Bakassi to Cameroon as well the contemporary claim of Cross River Nigeria to Southern Cameroon. Thus, this emanated from the effort to demarcate the land boundary and its inability to locate Pillar 113A, made the path of the demarcation to be extended from Pillar 113 upward. Beside this, the nature and character of African boundaries, especially Nigeria/Cameroon is worthy of attention. It should be recalled that many of border conflicts tend to emanate from the ill-defined nature of the boundaries- that divide ethnic groups with little or no consideration as well as the demarcation lines imposed by the colonial powers. In addition to the arbitrary nature of African State boundaries, they were ill-defined, poorly delimited and demarcated. While in some areas, such as the Nigeria-Cameroon, they were not demarcated at all. Thus, the artificiality and arbitrariness of African borders are the products and reflections of rivalries, conflict as well as hostility in African States. Arising from this, it is evident that the border incursions between Nigeria and Cameroon has telling effect on Nigerian State.

It is therefore, an amalgam of these problems that occupies Nigeria borders relations with Cameroon. Also, the cause of hostility and mutual distrust between the two countries. It will also discuss how Nigeria's border relations with Cameroon could be improved upon, especially with the contemporary claim of Cross River State, Nigeria to Southern Cameroon. This study is necessary because the issue is yet to receive the academic attention it deserves. Border incidences between Nigeria and Cameroon as earlier noted has been documented by many scholars. Among these scholars are Ajala (1980), Asiwaju (1984); Anene (1970); Brownlie(1997); Nwokedi (1984); Davidson (1992); Ate and Akinterinwa (1992) and host of others. The relevance of the Asiwaju analysis to an understanding of Nigeria-Cameroon border problems can be derived directly from the burden imposed by the history of the nation's entire boundary system. This is evident in the arbitrarily demarcation of African borders by the colonial powers without reference to the ethno-cultural affinities of the border areas. Thus, separate many communities from their ancestral home. Similarly, Starr and Most (1976) posit that national boundaries are, analytically, 'colonial borders' both in origin and orientation. Kapil (1966) his of the view that the delimitation agreements were negotiated before detailed knowledge of the terrains and peoples in the interior of the continent. The borders are

characteristically prone more to conflict than cooperative interaction with their neighbours, as African boundaries in many parts of the continent are not finally settled by the countries sharing the common boundaries. These points underscored the artificiality and the arbitrariness of African borders which is a source of reflections of rivalries in African States. Thus, the long Nigeria-Cameroon border inherited from the British and the Germans, and subsequently, the British and French (when France came into the picture in colonial Cameroon) was not clearly and completely demarcated most especially from the Cross River rapids southward to the coastline area. Ate (2000) expresses his concern that arbitrarily nature of the border does not only account for border problem between Nigeria-Cameroon but also Nigeria's unequal size in terms of population and the role of France in Cameroon. Also, his of the opinion that the availability of vital resources in the maritime and land boundary promotes the border incidence between Nigeria and Cameroon. Furthermore, the activities of the citizens along the border in terms of smuggling has been documented by scholars like Niger-Thomas (2001); Njoku (2010); and Meagher (2010). Smuggling along the Nigeria-Cameroon border is therefore regards as cross border trade activity and well organized business in such a way that the indigenous people of the border communities collaborate with influential state functionaries and citizens within the two states . Thus, this has a dire consequence on Nigeria's economy and the porosity of the border region has made border incursions to be frequent in the area.

However, the 2002 judgment by the ICJ boosted the concern for border communities as the court urged the two parties to ensure that the rights and interests of the local populations are respected. Thus, while the immediate attention is central to this study, focus on the demarcation of the land boundary on the basis of the delimitation in the court's judgment as UN-Cameroun-Nigeria Mixed Commission was established on delimitation and demarcation process. It was agreed that the final demarcation of the Nigeria/Cameroon border should cover not only maritime but also the land areas, since there are still some uncertainty regarding certain parts of the land frontier. This is to demarcate the land boundary and identify the boundary pillars by the Joint Nigeria-Cameroon technical commission to settle the boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Strikingly, the ICJ ruling was regarded as a matter of last resort in order to avoid the possibility of worsening relations between the states in conflict, not considering the uncertainty or the outcome of legal proceeding as well as the adverse effect of the ruling. To attain a more robust resolution of boundary incursions, the court practice in delimitation of boundaries was sponsored by UN designed for land boundary constituting of legal experts, surveyors and cartographers from both parties. However, this exercise does not take into consideration the effects on the lives and circumstances of people especially in terms of the demarcation of the land boundary which constitute the lacuna of this study. This is necessary because, the demarcation of the land boundary could cause confusions and tensions between the two countries as well as the inhabitants of the area. This is evident in the working plan for land demarcation to trace the pillar 113A. It was understood that a beacon erected on the chart was no longer shown on the adopted chart, as this made the team to recommend the beacon to be put back into a position in order to meet the requirements of the Geneva Convention. The shifting of this beacon invariably leads to the contemporary claim of some villages in Nigeria to Southern Cameroon. Hence, the demarcation of the land boundary is another cause for future chaos.

Conclusion

The paper discovered in details the factors that underline the Nigeria-Cameroon border relations before and after the ruling of the International Court of Justice ceding Bakassi Peninsula region to Cameroon. Also, it examined the contemporary claim of some communities in Cross River State, Nigeria to Cameroon. This has caused confusion and anxiety among the Nigerians living in the border communities in the state such as Obudu; Ikom; Boki and the new Bakassi Local Government areas with fear that the new exercise to delineate the boundary line between Nigeria and Cameroon would lead to loss of their cash crops and communities to Cameroon. In sum, the new exercise by the Joint Technical team, a sub-body of the Nigeria-Cameroon Mixed Commission mandated to carry out field work to trace, ascertain and reinforce the boundary points between the two countries is likely to cause confusion and degenerate to another border conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon as well as the inhabitant of the region. This is due to the fact that the economic interest of the people as well as the traditional and cultural affinities are not considered in the demarcation which portends a high risk of generating confusion and crises if not checked. Although, the implementation of the ICJ decision and subsequent negotiations are commendable but past experiences of this exercise on African Continent has not put an end to border skirmishes in the region. Examples are not far-fetched from Guinea,

Liberia and Sierra-Leone; Mali and Mauritania and many more, as border situation remains volatile and of high risk for the inhabitants therein.

Recommendation

Following the discussions above, the following recommendations to avoid future border conflict and skirmishes between Nigeria and Cameroon are made. First, there is need for more effective supervision of the Joint Technical Team by the two countries in the ongoing demarcation exercise. Second, the Joint Technical Team should take all necessary steps in locating the Pillar 113A rather than erecting a new Pillar, and if not found the two countries should negotiate on the boundary line that will be mutually beneficial for the two countries as well as the inhabitants of the area to avoid the escalation of hostilities in the region. If not so, the region may continue to fuel conflict on the continent regarding the land demarcation between the two countries.

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